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“WE’RE COOL” STATEMENTS AFTER
OMNICARE: SECURITIES FRAUD SUITS
FOR FAILURES TO COMPLY
WITH THE LAW
James D. Cox*
JUST as there was much celebration in Munchkin Land when Doro-thy’s house landed on the Wicked Witch of the East, so have securi-ties law academics, whether pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant,
celebrated the arrival of Omnicare Inc. v. Laborers District Council Con-
struction Industry Pension Fund.1 The cause for this celebration is that
Omnicare Inc. lands squarely on Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg,2
the Supreme Court’s earlier, opaque approach for treatment of the mate-
riality of opinion statements. In Virginia Bankshares, the Supreme Court
quickly concluded shareholders would attach significance to the board of
directors’ statement that the cash-out merger price was “fair” and “high”
so that the statement met the materiality standard, but emphasized there
was another, more perplexing, issue: whether such an opinion statement
was a statement of fact. On this question, Virginia Bankshares’ formula-
tion is hopelessly ambiguous except for the rather clear implication aris-
ing out of the record before the Court that opinion statements are
statements of facts when there is before the defendant objective evidence
in direct conflict with the professed opinion.3 Absent conflicting objective
evidence, the opinion statement is not a “fact” but a non-actionable mis-
representation of the defendant’s belief or motive.4
The preceding summary of Virginia Bankshares does not do justice to
the turgid quality of Justice Souter’s reasoning of what separates actiona-
ble from non-actionable opinion statements. As a result, Virginia Bank-
shares is a stimulating analytical exercise, but one steeped in nuance.
Moreover, Virginia Bankshares’ focus on what is a fact, rather than the
* Brainerd Currie Professor of Law, Duke University. The author is grateful for the
outstanding research assistance of Mr. Jeremy Bethel in preparing this article.
1. Omnicare Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct.
1318 (2015).
2. Va. Bankshares v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1091–99 (1991).
3. In Virginia Bankshares the board of directors was aware that the fair market value
of the firm’s assets was substantially greater than the book value on which the “high” and
“fair” statements were based. Also, the financial consultant advising the board believed the
firm’s value translated to about $60 a share although the price being supported by the
board with its opinion was $42. Id. at 1099.
4. Id. at 1096.
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materiality of what was communicated, appears at odds with a basic tenet
of the securities laws, namely providing information material to investors
and not on the forensic qualities of the information within the defen-
dant’s possession. As developed below, Omnicare Inc. returns the focus
to the traditional orientation of the information’s significance to the
investor.
I. IMPLICATIONS OF OMNICARE INC.
Omnicare Inc.’s contribution, as examined below, is far reaching as it
provides an understandable, indeed conventional vis-a`-vis the common
law, approach to assessing whether opinion statements as well as a wide
range of other statements are misleading. Moreover, Omnicare Inc.
harbors the strong potential to dramatically change existing approaches
to how we view an alleged misrepresentation under the federal securities
laws.
In a registration statement for its public offering, Omnicare stated it
“believed” its various contracts were “in compliance with applicable fed-
eral and state laws” and “legally and economically valid arrangements.”
Subsequent to the public offering, several federal government enforce-
ment suits were initiated against Omnicare, alleging that various aspects
of its contractual relationships and arrangements violated multiple provi-
sions of federal health care laws. The plaintiff pension funds that pur-
chased shares in the registered offering sued under Section 11 of the
Securities Act, alleging that the opinion statements were materially mis-
leading. Because securities issuers that commit a material misrepresenta-
tion in their registration statement have absolute liability under Section
11 of the Securities Act, the complaint did not allege awareness on the
part of Omnicare of facts inconsistent with the professed opinion of com-
pliance with the law. The complaint’s failure to allege such awareness
clashed with the formulation in Virginia Bankshares. The allegations in
Omnicare therefore posed two distinct questions: who has the burden of
establishing the existence of objective facts contrary to the stated opinion
of compliance with the law5 and whether this showing must be accompa-
nied by evidence of knowledge of such conflicting evidence by Omnicare
officials.6 Because Section 11 imposes strict liability on a security’s issuer,
Virginia Bankshares’ orthodoxy of placing both these burdens on the
plaintiff meshes poorly with the absolute liability regime housed in Sec-
tion 11. At the same time, Virginia Bankshares clearly requires objective
5. The Sixth Circuit held that though the plaintiffs did not have to establish that
Omnicare officials knew their belief was false, the funds were required to allege that the
professed beliefs were “objectively false.” Ind. State Dist. Council of Laborers & HOD
Carriers Pension & Welfare Fund v. Omnicare, Inc., 719 F.3d 498, 506–07 (6th Cir. 2013).
6. See Ind. State Dist. Council of Laborers & HOD Carriers Pension & Welfare Fund
v. Omnicare, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17526 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 13, 2012) (granting dismis-
sal of case because the complaint failed to allege “the company’s officers knew they were
violating the law”).
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facts before the defendant that are inconsistent with the opinion as a pre-
condition to that opinion statement being a fact.
A key step in Justice Kagan’s majority opinion in Omnicare Inc. is rec-
ognizing that Section 11, similar to other disclosure provisions, focuses on
what is stated as well as what is omitted from what is stated. Thus, her
approach to opinion statements is consistent with the rich body of law
that has developed surrounding statements held to be misleading because
they constitute a half-truth.7 She observes “a reasonable investor may,
depending on the circumstances, understand an opinion statement to con-
vey facts about how the speaker has formed the opinion. . . . [I]f the real
facts are otherwise, but not provided, the opinion statement will mislead
its audience.” Because the securities laws, and Section 11 expressly, con-
demn not only what is materially misstated but also what is materially
omitted, Omnicare Inc. was able to focus on whether facts related to the
opinion needed to be disclosed to prevent the opinion statement from
being misleading.
[A]n investor cannot state a claim by alleging only that an opinion
was wrong; the complaint must as well call into question the issuer’s
basis for offering the opinion. . . . [A] cause of action [exists] only
when an issuer’s failure to include a material fact has rendered a
published statement misleading. . . . The investor must identify par-
ticular (and material) facts going to the basis for the issuer’s opinion
– facts about the inquiry the issuer did or did not conduct or the
knowledge it did or did not have – whose omission makes the opin-
ion statement at issue misleading to a reasonable person reading the
statement fairly and in context.8
Because Omnicare’s opinion statements focused on its purported compli-
ance with the law, the opinion applied the above formulation to such
statements:
Consider an unadorned statement of opinion about legal compliance:
“We believe our conduct is lawful.” If the issuer makes that state-
ment without having consulted a lawyer, it could be misleadingly in-
complete . . . [A]n investor, although recognizing that legal opinions
can prove wrong in the end, still likely expects such an assertion to
rest on some meaningful legal inquiry . . . Similarly, if the issuer
made the statement in the face of its lawyers’ contrary advice, or
with knowledge that the Federal Government was taking the oppo-
site view, the investor again has cause to complain: He expects not
just that the issuer believes the opinion . . . but that it fairly aligns
with the information in the issuer’s possession at the time.9
The investor referenced above is the objectively qualified investor. Thus,
the formulation for opinion statements is the orthodox half-truth doctrine
where, even under the strict liability standard of Section 11, the burden is
7. Omnicare Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct.
1318, 1330–31 (2015).
8. Id. at 1332.
9. Id. at 1328–29.
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upon plaintiff to establish under the totality of the circumstances that
omitted facts were necessary to disclose in order to render the opinion
statement not materially misleading. In the absolute liability context, such
as Omnicare Inc., the preceding formulation, while requiring the plaintiff
to allege what facts were not disclosed that were needed to render what
was said not misleading, the plaintiff is not required to further establish
that the issuer was aware of those facts. At the same time, whereas Vir-
ginia Bankshares conceded that directors’ opinions of the fairness of
merger terms are always material, after Omnicare Inc. this concedes too
much: the plaintiff must establish the material falsity of that opinion.10
A final point posed by Omnicare Inc. is whether it weakens the doctri-
naire bulwark that lower courts have developed that generalized state-
ments of optimism, commonly referred to as puffery, are not material.
For example, consider J.P. Morgan’s touting that the company’s “risk
management processes . . . are highly disciplined,” a claim it made on the
cusp of the recent financial crisis that nearly terminated the firm because
of excessive exposure to risk. Before Omnicare Inc., the court had ample
precedent to support dismissal of the suit on the grounds the claim was
non-actionable puffery.11 After Omnicare Inc., the outcome of such a suit
is surrounded by a good deal of uncertainty since J.P. Morgan’s statement
is not distinguishable from Omnicare Inc.’s statement, “[w]e believe our
contract arrangements . . . are in compliance with applicable federal and
state laws.”12 Each are generalized statements of opinion, and each point
to a body of facts and principles upon which investors can be expected to
believe management premised its opinion. Moreover, each appears po-
tentially actionable under Omnicare Inc.’s formulation of considering
how the statement is likely understood by the reasonable investor so that
the plaintiff can challenge the statement as a half-truth based on facts
before the speaker that were materially inconsistent with the professed
optimistic statement. In the end, puffery is but an optimistic opinion that
the investor can expect the speaker has some factual basis. Absent that
factual basis, the opinion is actionable.
10. Consider here Omnicare Inc.’s further qualification:
An opinion statement, however, is not necessarily misleading when an issuer
knows, but fails to disclose, some fact cutting the other way. Reasonable in-
vestors understand that opinions sometimes rest on a weighing of competing
facts; indeed, the presence of such facts is one reason why an issuer may
frame a statement as an opinion, thus conveying uncertainty . . . Suppose, for
example, that in stating an opinion about legal compliance, the issuer did not
disclose that a single junior attorney expressed doubts about a practice’s le-
gality, when six of his more senior colleagues gave a stamp of approval. That
omission would not make the statement of opinion misleading, even if the
minority position ultimately proved correct: A reasonable investor does not
expect that every fact known to an issuer supports its opinion statement.
Id. at 1329 (emphasis in original).
11. ECA & Local 134 IBEW Joint Pension Trust of Chi. v. J.P. Morgan Chase Co., 553
F.3d 187, 195 (2d Cir. 2009).
12. Omnicare, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 1323.
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Because managers of public firms inevitably enjoy much better infor-
mation about the firm than do investors, the insights, observations, com-
ments, etc. by managers about matters uniquely within management’s
sphere of knowledge can always be expected to pique the interest of in-
vestors. Certainly risk management by financial institutions has grown in
significance to investors following the recent financial crisis so that state-
ments such as those by J.P. Morgan are likely today to be of even greater
significance to investors than they were when J.P. Morgan first made its
claim. Investor interest in management stewardship obviously extends be-
yond just financial risk; it includes how regulatory requirements that de-
fine the firm’s environment, and hence its operations and future, are
impacting the firm’s on-going operations. A clear disclosure requirement
on these points appears in the SEC’s management discussion and analysis
provision that calls for disclosure in documents filed with the SEC of any
existing trend or uncertainty management reasonably expects will have a
material impact on the firm’s operations.13 As one recent court reasoned,
the failure to satisfy this requirement implies that management is not
aware of any such condition or circumstance.14 Observe that the disclo-
sure elicited by this provision is exactly the kind of statement now cov-
ered by Omnicare Inc. and can therefore include disclosures of
philosophy, policies, and practices employed by managers in their opera-
tion and oversight of the firm. But disclosure of such matters is inherently
sensitive, not only because they can upon disclosure erode competitive
advantages, but also because some firms do pursue unreasonable or un-
lawful means to compete for revenues so that shining a light on their anti-
social practices invites prosecution for the resulting wrongdoing. It is on
this point—the quality of management’s stewardship—that we can expect
to see a significant fissure develop in Omnicare Inc.’s wake from the
weaknesses of state fiduciary law to discipline unreasonable or unlawful
corporate stewardship.
II. LEGAL COMPLIANCE AND THE TIMIDITY OF STATE
LAW
In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation15 is among the
most significant corporate decisions because it provided significant legal
compulsion for boards of directors to establish, maintain, and monitor
legal compliance programs. The task before Chancellor Allen was unin-
spiring and non-controversial—approving the settlement of a questiona-
bly initiated derivative suit alleging the corporation’s board of directors
failed to provide appropriate oversight of the healthcare firm. Caremark
had incurred substantial costs and a significant fine in connection with its
settlement of a government enforcement action claiming that Caremark
13. Item 303, SEC Regulation S-K., 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii) & (b) (2015).
14. Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 2015). Contra In re
NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d 1046, 1056–57 (9th Cir. 2014).
15. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967–70 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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had over the years systematically provided kickbacks and other rewards
to hospitals and doctors in return for their directing business to
Caremark. The parasitic derivative suit followed the government action;
the derivative suit plaintiffs agreed to settle in return for Caremark agree-
ing to modest governance therapeutics to justify the sought-for fee award.
As uninspiring as were the terms of the settlement, Chancellor Allen
used the occasion to enshrine in the directors’ duty of good faith an af-
firmative obligation to install, maintain, and monitor legal compliance
programs. Chancellor Allen’s dicta that the directors’ duty of good faith
can be violated if they have a “sustained and systematic failure” to estab-
lish and exercise reasonable oversight of a legal compliance system added
state law fiduciary obligations to existing forces compelling legal compli-
ance programs. Prior to the decision, prudent companies considered com-
pliance programs a necessary appendage of best governance practices and
a valuable factor considered by prosecutors and courts in considering
sanctions to be imposed for corporate misconduct. These considerations
became overwhelming following Caremark as personal liability was now
possible for failure to install, maintain, and enforce law compliance pro-
grams. Indeed, such law compliance systems quickly became institutional-
ized as a cornerstone of good governance devices.16
Caremark’s clarion call, when joined with the growing impact of the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for Business Organizations that favor defend-
ants with well-crafted and deployed compliance programs, not only made
compliance programs ubiquitous but also heightened investor and share-
holder interest in corporations complying with the law. In spite of this
heightened interest, the actual number of suits initiated for alleged
breach of fiduciary duty for alleged corporate failure to comply with the
law is extremely small and the success rate for such suits is quite low.
Among the dramatic successes is In re Abbott Laboratories Derivative
Shareholder Litigation,17 where the Seventh Circuit sustained a suit’s con-
tinuance in the face of allegations that over a six-year period the corpora-
tion had received several FDA warnings, some of which reached the
board of directors, that ultimately led to a significant fine and the destruc-
tion of millions of dollars of inventory.18
Nonetheless, the challenges facing such state law actions are formida-
ble. Caremark demands a substantial departure on the part of the board
of directors—“a sustained and systematic failure” to be precise. Thus, a
suit involving one of the most fundamental breakdowns in monitoring
any firm’s operations, that of Citigroup Inc. in the most recent financial
16. ABA, Corporate Director’s Guidebook, at 33 (6th ed. 2015).
17. In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S’holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 802, 811 (7th Cir.
2003).
18. See also Rich ex rel. Fuqi Intern., Inc. v. Yu Kwai Chong, 66 A.3d 963, 968, 984,
986 (Del. Ch. 2013) (approving suit involving accounting system acknowledged by the firm
to be so inadequate that it produced $130 million in accounting errors and caused Nasdaq
to threaten firm with delisting); In Re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 965 A.2d 763, 774 (Del. Ch.
2009) (sustaining complaint alleging firm engaged in a criminal enterprise that was greatly
facilitated by substantial weaknesses in internal controls).
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crisis, was dismissed due to the high presumption of propriety accorded
the action of independent directors. In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder De-
rivative Litigation19 arose after the near bankruptcy of Citigroup due to
its large exposure to the subprime lending markets. The suit focused on
multiple “red flags,” such as an economist’s forecast that a speculative
housing bubble was nearing its end, that a leading subprime lender was
closing 229 of its offices, that another lender had filed for bankruptcy,
that analysts were downgrading subprime mortgages, and that another
lender had warned that there were increasing subprime delinquencies.
[The “red flags”] amount to little more than portions of public docu-
ments that reflected the worsening conditions in the subprime mort-
gage market and in the economy generally. Plaintiffs fail to plead
“particularized facts suggesting that the Board was presented with
‘red flags’ alerting it to potential misconduct” . . . [The plaintiffs]
repeatedly make the conclusory allegation that the defendants have
breached their duty of oversight, but nowhere do [they] adequately
explain what the director defendants actually did or failed to do that
would constitute such a violation. Even while admitting that Ci-
tigroup had a risk monitoring system in place, plaintiffs seem to con-
clude that, because the director defendants . . . were charged with
monitoring Citigroup’s risk, then they must be found liable because
Citigroup experienced losses as a result of exposure to the subprime
mortgage market. The only factual support plaintiffs provide for this
conclusion are “red flags” that actually amount to nothing more than
signs of continuing deterioration in the subprime mortgage market.
These types of conclusory allegations are exactly the kind of allega-
tion that do not state a claim for relief under Caremark.20
The above treatment of Caremark is especially troubling in Delaware.
Unlike other corporate jurisdictions, Delaware removes the presumption
of the business judgment rule upon the showing of breaching conduct
with the effect that the plaintiff is not burdened with establishing how the
breach proximately harmed the corporation or its shareholders.21 To be
sure, the plaintiff could easily have alleged that directors responding rea-
sonably to the red flags could have at least inquired whether, in light of
the developments captured in the red flags, taking on new exposures to
subprime mortgages was prudent and whether reducing existing expo-
sures was desirable. Under the Delaware approach to causation, defend-
ants would bear the burden of exploring whether action on their part
would in fact have mitigated the significant losses ultimately suffered by
Citigroup. Moreover, there does not appear any particular policy reason
why Caremark should be cabined to illegal misconduct. To be sure,
Caremark sprang forth from illegal misconduct and part of the justifica-
tion advanced by Chancellor Allen was the impact of the U.S. Criminal
Sentencing Guidelines. But behind Caremark is a strong belief that direc-
19. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 111 (Del. Ch. 2009).
20. Id. at 129–30.
21. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993).
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tors are monitors and thus need to install information systems to reduce
crime but also to protect the financial interest of the corporation and
shareholders. Corporations such as Citibank would be woefully short-
sighted were surveillance systems installed only to monitor tellers to de-
ter embezzlement but not monitor whether the business climate exposed
the corporation to potential catastrophic losses.
Further impediment to such law compliance suits is the broad adoption
of immunity shields whereby a provision in a corporation’s articles of in-
corporation shield directors from liability for damages absent knowing
misconduct by the directors.22 In the face of pervasive immunity shields,
it is not possible to recover from directors for their failure to reasonably
monitor management and business practices that cause substantial loss to
the corporation. This indeed is the result reached in Citigroup where the
clarion red flags were insufficient to move the alleged director miscon-
duct beyond the immunity shield.
But the ultimate bulwark for directors against Caremark-based claims
is the demand requirement that conditions pursuit of a derivative suit on
the suit’s plaintiff overcoming the board’s unsurprising reluctance to ap-
prove a suit against itself. In broad overview, a growing number of states
condition the derivative suit’s continuance on the presiding court finding
that the suit is in the corporation’s interest. This determination in law
compliance cases tilts favorably toward the board of directors, the very
parties alleged to be at the heart of the breach, because the directors are
deemed sufficiently independent in rendering an opinion regarding the
corporation’s interest served by the suit. The bias is even stronger in the
more common demand-required jurisdictions, such as Delaware. Indeed,
the issue before the Delaware court in Citigroup was whether a demand
on the board could be excused; the court held the suit must be dismissed
for failure to make a demand on the board. Thus, we can see that
Caremark is important, it nudges directors toward better practices with
respect to oversight of compliance programs, but enforcement occurs by
social norms to pursue the right course, not by a substantial fear of liabil-
ity for doing the wrong thing.
Federal securities litigation has, however, moved into the vacuum left
by state law. As reviewed in the next section, over the last few years there
has been a good deal of litigation under the antifraud provision, similar to
that in Omnicare Inc., which focused on disclosures that projected a mis-
leading report of the management’s compliance with the law so that the
overall quality of the firm’s earnings were misrepresented.
III. DISCIPLINING POOR STEWARDS UNDER THE
SECURITIES LAWS
The template for successful pleading of an antifraud claim based on
assertions of trustworthy compliance systems prior to Omnicare Inc. was
22. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2015).
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Reese v. Malone.23 Following a series of oil spills and significant govern-
mental enforcement actions for multiple violations of environmental
laws, a securities class action was filed against British Petroleum (BP).
Among the statements targeted in the suit was the representation in BP’s
2005 Annual Report: “Management believes that the Group’s activities
are in compliance in all material respects with applicable environmental
laws and regulations.” In finding the statement false, the Ninth Circuit
reasoned as follows:
Statements of legal compliance are pled with adequate falsity when
documents detail specific violations of law that existed at the time
the warranties were made . . . Here, the complaint cites evidence of
numerous violations, confirmed and alleged, of environmental laws
and regulations, including: (1) the Clean Water Act, evidenced by
BP’s 2007 Guilty Plea with the DOJ; (2) Alaskan laws, evidenced by
the company’s civil settlement with the State; and (3) Pipeline Safety
Laws, arising from BP-Alaska’s failure to comply with [various Cor-
rective Action Orders issued by regulators]. Based on these allega-
tions—the validity of which were ultimately confirmed by the
company’s guilty plea, consent decree, and millions of dollars in fines
and penalties—defendants cannot say that they were in compliance,
in all material respects, with applicable environmental laws and regu-
lations . . .
The . . . question is whether BP escapes possible liability by prefac-
ing the statement with the phrase “management believes,” and using
the qualifier material compliance . . .
A statement of belief is a “‘factual’ misstatement actionable under
Section 10(b) if (1) the statement is not actually believed, (2) there is
no reasonable basis for the belief, or (3) the speaker is aware of un-
disclosed facts tending seriously to undermine the statement’s accu-
racy.” Kaplan v. Rose, 49 F.3d 1363, 1375 (9th Cir. 1994) . . . The
mere fact of ongoing “discussions” with regulators is insufficient to
create a belief in “material compliance” with the law. Here, the vio-
lations of environmental law were egregious—BP had just spilled
over 200,000 gallons of oil onto the Alaskan tundra in violation of
the Clean Water Act. Its corrosion monitoring and leak detection
systems fell below industry standards and state requirements. And
the discussions with regulators took place in the context of recent
violations of the terms of the Corrective Action Order, imposed to
mitigate “hazard[s] to life, property and the environment.” Based on
the pled facts, it is unclear how BP’s management could consider the
company to be “in compliance” or, alternatively, could view the vio-
lations to be immaterial.
For the foregoing reasons, we find that plaintiffs have adequately
pled falsity.24
What appears most questionable with the Ninth Circuit’s formulation is
the bare allegation that BP did not believe its own opinion statement;
23. Reese v. Malone, 747 F.3d 557 (9th Cir. 2014).
24. Id. at 578–79.
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Virginia Bankshares clearly rules out such a claim, unless objective evi-
dence is introduced that supports the conclusion that the uttered opinion
could not have been believed. On the other hand, Omnicare Inc. fully
supports both of the remaining grounds because they each rest on a mate-
rial misrepresentation being made in the form of a misstatement that
there is a basis for the opinion and omission of material facts needed to
render what was said to not be misleading, respectively.
While it may appear that Omnicare Inc. did not alter the formulation
for judging claims of compliance from that illustrated in Reese, the Su-
preme Court’s most recent treatment of opinion statements’ indelible
contribution is mandating close analysis of generalized statements of law
compliance such as those in Reese and Citigroup. Prior to Omnicare Inc.,
reassuring claims of compliance were frequently dismissed as harmless
puffery. For example, the Second Circuit dismissed claims based on J.P.
Morgan’s statement that it had “highly disciplined” risk management
practices, reasoning J.P. Morgan’s assertions were merely puffery.25 After
Omnicare Inc., the generality of the claim gives way to whether manage-
ment had a basis for the assertion and, if so, whether there was material
information inconsistent with the claim that was not disclosed. Simply
stated, a statement of compliance can be material despite being genera-
lized and of the type investors would expect. So viewed, Omnicare Inc.
qualifies substantially earlier jurisprudence dismissive of generalized opti-
mistic expressions about management’s stewardship.26 Another signifi-
cant impact of Omnicare Inc. is that it relieves the plaintiff of the burden
of alleging facts of knowing noncompliance with the law;27 after Omni-
care Inc., the plaintiff can put into issue that the claim of compliance is
baseless in light of pervasive violations, and hence porosity of the claimed
compliance system. It remains to be seen to what extent Omnicare Inc.’s
emphasis on resort to the half-truth framework will impact other areas.
In addition to recasting puffery as examined above, another potential
area ripe for reconsideration is the “Bespeaks Caution” doctrine that
25. ECA Local 134 IBEW Joint Pension Trust of Chi. v. JP Morgan Chase Co., 553
F.3d 187, 206 (2d Cir. 2009).
26. See In re Ford Motor Co. Sec. Litig., 381 F.3d 563, 570–72 (6th Cir. 2004) (Ford is
designing safety into its cars in suit based on nondisclosure of problems related to Bridge-
stone ATX tires on its Ford Explorer); Gusinsky v. Barclays PLC, 944 F. Supp. 2d 279, 288
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (general statements of commitment to good corporate practices and main-
taining internal controls not actionable where bank engaged in manipulating LIBOR rate
used in its business); In re Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc. Sec. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d
452, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (statement that firm provided “independence of thought and ob-
jective advice” was mere puffery even though practices pursued were steering clients to
vendors who rewarded the defendant with kickbacks); In re Kidder Peabody Sec. Litig., 10
F. Supp. 2d 398, 413 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (defendant’s reassurances regarding its culture,
controls, and integrity were mere puffery in suit alleging pervasive scheme to increase prof-
its by phantom trading in customer accounts).
27. See Kushner v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 317 F.3d 820, 831 (8th Cir. 2003) (despite
pervasive double-recording of charges to Medicare patients suit based on assurances of
trustworthy compliance program dismissed for failure to allege senior officers were aware
of double billing scheme).
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protects forward looking statements. Outside the statutory safe harbor28
that protects knowingly false forecasts that are accompanied by meaning-
ful cautionary language, courts have fairly consistently held that caution-
ary language is not meaningful if the defendant, when issuing a forward-
looking statement, is aware of material facts that are inconsistent with the
forward-looking statement.29 This sensible result may well be extended to
the statutory safe harbor on the reasoning of Omnicare Inc. that the
known-undisclosed fact needed to be disclosed to prevent the cautionary
language from itself being misleading.30
IV. CONCLUSION
Investors assess firms on the basis of their future operations. The regu-
latory environment that defines their markets necessarily impacts firm
costs and revenues and therefore can have a profound impact on any
firm’s financial performance and position. Management’s statements re-
garding the firm’s performance in light of regulatory strictures is necessa-
rily important to investors and thus, a natural area for management to
make disclosures to meet investor expectations. Omnicare Inc.’s focus on
whether such statements misstate or omit material facts provides new
vigor to assessing whether general statements of compliance with the law
are misleading when actual practices are quite different.
To be sure, Omnicare Inc. does not provide the plaintiff with a friction-
less glide path. The sine qua non for action is an affirmative statement of
compliance. Inconclusive references to prevailing regulations, such as ex-
ternal regulations or internal codes of ethics, without express assurance of
their being any reference to compliance will, as has occurred in the past,
28. Securities Exchange Act Section 21E, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5 (2015).
29. See, e.g., Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 544 (5th Cir. 1981),
rev’d in part on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983) (“To warn that the untoward may occur
when the event is contingent is prudent; to caution that it is only possible for the unfavora-
ble events to happen when they have already occurred is deceit.”); see also Franklin High
Yield v. Cty. of Martin, 152 F.3d 736 (8th Cir. 1998) (professed uncertainty whether any
shortfall would be addressed through entity’s taxing authority misleading when it was
known the municipality would not use its taxing authority); Kline v. First W. Gov’t Sec.,
Inc., 24 F.3d 480 (3d Cir. 1994) (disclaimer in attorney’s opinion does not protect against
knowledge that facts on which such uncertainty could be based are materially different so
that probable IRS treatment was known). However, most courts do not reach the same
result when the forward looking statement is examined under the statutory safe harbor for
forward looking statements. See Allan Horwich, Cleaning the Murky Safe Harbor for For-
ward-Looking Statements: An Inquiry Into Whether Actual Knowledge of Falsity Precludes
The Meaningful Cautionary Statement Defense, 35 J. CORP. L. 519 (2010) (close analysis of
extensive case law to conclude that cautionary statement renders the false statement
immaterial).
30. This result can be seen as consistent with Congress’s intent in creating a separate
safe harbor for forward-looking statements accompanied by meaningful cautionary lan-
guage as well as statements, not covered by such cautionary statements that were not made
with knowledge of their falsity. As reasoned above, a reckless omission of a fact that pre-
vented cautionary language from being meaningful would remain protected so that the
twin safe harbors continue to exist. In contrast, a knowing omission of a fact necessary to
understand the cautionary language would be actionable which appears consistent with the
safe harbor that does not apply to knowing violations.
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not be sufficiently definitive to survive a motion to dismiss.31 Nonethe-
less, firm statements, such as those made by Omnicare are now to be
assessed by their materiality so that the statement is actionable if there is
no basis supporting the “we’re clean” statement or facts exist that are
materially necessary to qualify the statement.
Omnicare Inc.’s impact, however, is broad because Justice Kagan’s
opinion is not narrowly focused; her opinion is not anchored on opinion
statements but rather on what is a misrepresentation. In so doing, she
returns disclosure to its common law roots where materiality is guided by
the objective standard of the reasonable investor. This orientation, as ex-
amined above, invites reconsideration of developments—opinion state-
ments, puffery, and forward-looking statements—that have interpreted
disclosure duties without considering the reasonable investor. It is now up
to the lower courts to steer this new course in light of the compass pro-
vided by Omnicare Inc.
31. See Dailey v. Medlock, 551 Fed. App’x 841, 842, 846 (6th Cir. 2014) (“we are re-
quired by federal and state regulatory authorities to maintain adequate levels of capital to
support our operations”); Desai v. Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 654 F. Supp. 2d 836, 857, 859
(N.D. Ill. 2009) (publishing code of ethics on website does not represent compliance with
its provisions by officers); Andropolis v. Red Robin Gourmet Burgers, Inc., 505 F. Supp.
2d 662, 686 (D. Colo. 2007) (announcement of a new code of ethics not misleading even
though there were contemporary breaches of the code that were not then disclosed).
